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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This paper is a commentary upon the important analytical work 
done by Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer. The focus of my commen-
tary is upon their most recent work, that dealing with the govern-
ment’s high win-rate before the Supreme Court: The Government 
Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law.1 Although I will focus 
primarily upon what these authors have to say about the government 
win-rate before the Court, I will extend my remarks at times to refer 
to their earlier work on the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision.2 
 In their most recent work, Cohen and Spitzer have provided sta-
tistical proof of a proposition which most of us had believed or sus-
pected: the federal government is, in general, significantly more suc-
cessful before the Supreme Court than are other parties. Cohen and 
Spitzer accompany their quantitative analysis with a theoretical ex-
planation: the government wins more often because it is highly selec-
tive in the cases which it brings before the Court.3 
                                                                                                                  
 * Robbins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.  
 1. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Im-
plications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer, 
Government Litigant Advantage]. 
 2. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW & 
CONTEMP.  PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65 [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle]; 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 3. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 395. 
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 This is not the first time that Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer 
have investigated the government’s success before the Supreme 
Court. For several years they have been investigating how an osten-
sibly impartial judicial system skews results towards the govern-
ment. In 1994, they published their first analysis of judicial defer-
ence to government administrators, Solving the Chevron Puzzle.4 In 
1996, they published their influential article, Judicial Deference to 
Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test.5 In 
these articles Cohen and Spitzer have provided us with a theory 
about deference and an empirical investigation supporting that the-
ory. Now, several years later, they are again addressing the question 
of how it is that a seemingly impartial judiciary apparently skews its 
decisionmaking in favor of the government. Again, Cohen and Spit-
zer have provided us with a theory about how this result comes to 
pass and with a quantitative analysis which supports their theory. 
 In their earlier articles, Cohen and Spitzer contended that the 
deference towards agency interpretations which the Supreme Court 
had commanded in its Chevron decision was grounded in the policy 
concerns of the Justices. 6 When the Reagan Administration replaced 
the Carter Administration in 1981, its executive agencies adopted 
more conservative positions. 7 By commanding greater deference by 
the courts to administrative interpretations, the Supreme Court en-
sured that the conservative agenda of the Reagan administration 
would not be undermined by a hostile judiciary. Thus, their Chevron 
article provided an explanation about why government regulators 
tended to prevail in the courts. They prevailed because the Court 
throughout the mid-1980s insisted upon an increased amount of def-
erence.8 They continue to prevail because the Court has not signaled 
that the higher-deference standard imposed in the mid-eighties 
should be modified. 
 In their current paper, Cohen and Spitzer provide us with another 
analysis of why government regulators tend to prevail in the courts. 
This time their focus is upon the Supreme Court. These regulators 
(acting through the Solicitor General’s office) petition for certiorari 
strategically, petitioning only when the chances of winning are high.9 
The government’s petitioning strategy is dominated by policy consid-
erations which are irrelevant to its private-party opponents.10 The 
government is concerned with pursuing its chosen policies and wants 
                                                                                                                  
 4. Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2. 
 5. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Ra-
tional Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996). 
 6. See Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 71-78. 
 7. See id. at 77. 
 8. See id. supra note 2, at 99-100. 
 9. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 404-05. 
 10. See id. at 416-17. 
2000]  COHEN-SPITZER ANALYSIS 429 
 
to avoid generating Supreme Court precedents unfavorable to those 
policies. Because a Supreme Court ruling creates a precedent 
throughout the nation, while a circuit court precedent is limited to a 
single circuit, the government wants especially to avoid the genera-
tion of Supreme Court precedents which would interfere with its pol-
icy program. Consequently, in many cases its potential losses from 
an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling are likely to outweigh its gains 
from a favorable ruling. Thus, the government is likely to seek Su-
preme Court review only when the likelihood of a favorable ruling is 
high.11  
 However, the private parties opposing the government choose 
their appeal strategies from a quite different standpoint.12 Because 
the private parties are generally in court on a one-shot basis, they 
are not concerned at all with the precedential effect of a Supreme 
Court decision. Each party is concerned only with the results in its 
own particular case. Thus, when the stakes are high enough, private 
parties will be inclined to seek Supreme Court review, even in cases 
in which their legal costs are high and their probabilities of winning 
are low. The government achieves a high win-rate because it appeals 
only those cases in which it is likely to prevail. The Court’s decisions 
are not skewed to the government’s positions; rather, the govern-
ment’s appeals are skewed to the anticipated positions of the Court.13 
 These conclusions are both unexceptionable and revealing. We all 
know that the government tends to be successful at the Supreme 
Court. If we didn’t know that already, there is a vast literature to 
which we might have recourse which tells us that the government 
tends to be successful at the Supreme Court. 14 Moreover, we all know 
that repeat players manage their strategies differently from nonre-
peat (or ad hoc) players.15 And we also know, or should know, that 
the Solicitor General is governed by these same repeat-player incen-
                                                                                                                  
 11. See id. at 395. 
 12. See id. at 416-17. 
 13. See id. at 395. 
 14. See David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Ex-
planations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551, 555 (1990) (“The Office of the Solicitor 
General, which represents all government agencies in the Supreme Court, is rigorously se-
lective regarding the cases it takes to the Court. Partly as a result, it has an enviable re-
cord of success before that body.”). Professor Chemerinsky has complained that all gov-
ernments (federal, state, and local) tend to win before the Supreme Court. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term–Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 43, 57 (1989). In a discussion of the Supreme Court’ review of Ninth Circuit 
decisions, Professor Herald noted a similar tendency. See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Va-
cated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 
405, 412 (1998). 
 15. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). See also Shilton, supra note 14. 
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tives. 16 Cohen and Spitzer, however, have provided us with a quanti-
tative analysis which provides solid support for these results. Accord-
ingly, they have moved us forward from folk wisdom to scientific 
specification and empirical support. Our discussions, henceforth, of 
government litigation strategy and its impact on Supreme Court rul-
ings will begin at the new, more solid level to which Cohen and 
Spitzer have brought us. In addition, Cohen and Spitzer have re-
vealed with stunning clarity that a major explanation for the high 
government win-rate is to be found in the highly sophisticated selec-
tion process of the Solicitor General’s office. 
II.   AN ASSESSMENT AND A COMMENTARY: AN OUTLINE 
 In the following pages, I explore the legal and institutional con-
text of the government strategizing which Cohen and Spitzer have 
identified. In pursuing this exploration, I recognize in Part III a ten-
dency, in all institutions, toward aggrandizing their power. It would 
obviously be an oversimplification of reality to assume that this ten-
dency explains all institutional behavior; however, it is nonetheless 
helpful to focus our attention upon how, in what directions, and upon 
what type of issues the Court and the executive would attempt to ag-
grandize their powers, if and when they are doing so.  
 Next, in Part IV, I raise the question of the time horizons of these 
institutions. Would we expect the Court to attempt to maximize its 
powers in the short run or the long run? What is its likely time hori-
zon or discount rate? What is the time horizon of the executive? What 
was the Court’s discount rate in its Chevron decision? Was Chevron 
decided for short-run or long-run policy goals? Does it make a differ-
ence? I raise the last two questions about a number of related sepa-
ration-of-powers cases which the Court decided in the 1970s and 
1980s, and conclude that the Court’s time horizon in these cases is 
unclear.  
                                                                                                                  
 16. See, e.g., James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 
IND. L.J. 675, 683 n.51 (1990) (“The Solicitor General is able to minimize his overall losses 
by not appealing cases lost in the lower courts that might be affirmed by the Supreme 
Court and thus cover the whole country rather than just one circuit.”); Arthur D. Hellman, 
The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 417 n.34 (“A princi-
pal reason for the Government’s success is that the Solicitor General carefully screens the 
cases in which the Government has lost in the court below.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Litigat-
ing Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 182-83 (1997) (“The United States will . . . decline to petition 
for a writ of certiorari in certain cases . . . . The government’s strategic objective is to press 
its legal argument in a case with sympathetic facts.”); Shilton, supra note 14 (discussing 
the Solicitor General’s petitioning strategy); see also United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 
154, 161 (1984) (“Unlike a private litigant who generally does not forgo an appeal if he be-
lieves that he can prevail, the Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the 
limited resources of the Government and the crowded dockets of the courts, before author-
izing an appeal.”). 
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 In Part V, I caution against idealizing the Court’s role in inter-
preting constitutional and legislative provisions. There I argue that 
those who believe that the Court is entitled to rule upon all impor-
tant legal issues are mistaken. The determination of what issues the 
Court will address is highly contingent. It depends (both descrip-
tively and normatively) upon the development of disputes and upon 
the appeal strategies of the parties, including the government’s ap-
peal strategies.  
 In Part VI, I address the constitutional tradition directly. I show 
that Alexis de Tocqueville accurately described the characteristics of 
American courts and that these characteristics were incorporated 
into the constitutional design and into the tradition generated by 
that design. It then follows that the government’s strategizing over 
petitions to the Court for review is part of the interbranch rivalry 
contemplated by the Framers and relied upon by them as means by 
which the branches keep each other in check.  
 In Part VII, I illustrate the government’s appeal strategy as part 
of interbranch rivalry, employing the method of positive political the-
ory (PPT). Finally, in Part VIII, I show that in addition to the inter-
branch rivalry, which is part of the constitutional design, there is an-
other tradition spawned by the separation-of-powers structure, one 
which values the autonomy of each of the constitutional branches. 
That is, however, a double-faceted tradition. One facet of that tradi-
tion is concerned with each branch’s assertion of its own autonomy. 
The other focuses upon the respect which each branch accords to the 
autonomy of the others. The former aspect of the tradition, branch 
autonomy, provides direct support for the executive’s strategizing 
under review. Under the latter aspect of the tradition, respecting the 
other branches’ autonomy, the courts accord wide scope to the inter-
pretative function of the executive branch. I show that this tradition 
is an old one, extending at least to the early nineteenth century. This 
part of the tradition provides support for the government’s behavior 
as well. Thus, while interbranch rivalry fully explains and justifies 
the government’s strategizing over appeals, both facets of a related 
but separate tradition having to do with the autonomy of the 
branches can be understood as providing additional support for this 
behavior. 
 Thus, I attempt to show, from a variety of perspectives, that the 
government’s strategizing underlying its high win-rate is the kind of 
government behavior which we would expect from a government 
structure like that of the United States. Indeed, the strategizing 
which Cohen and Spitzer have identified is exactly the kind of activ-
ity which the constitutional Framers intended. Thus Cohen and Spit-
zer have given us somewhat more than they are claiming. They claim 
merely to provide us with a quantitative analysis showing that 
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the government wins at a high rate because of the strategic way it se-
lects cases for appeal. But they have given us a new (quantitative) 
description of the way the constitutional structure operates. 
III.   INSTITUTIONAL POWER MAXIMIZING 
 Positive political theory (PPT) has come to play an increasingly 
important role in administrative law analysis and theory.17 Cohen 
and Spitzer have themselves employed PPT in their earlier papers. 18 
Analysts employing PPT frequently adopt the assumption that each 
of the institutional actors being considered is seeking to maximize its 
powers. In their earlier Chevron papers, Cohen and Spitzer assumed 
that the Court wants to maximize its power.19 This assumption was 
useful to their analysis of deference. While they do not employ as-
sumptions of power maximizing explicitly in their present paper, 
their analysis appears to assume that both the Court and the execu-
tive branch are attempting to maximize their respective powers. 
These assumptions, especially if understood as broad tendencies, are 
unexceptionable. Indeed, the Framers appear to have designed the 
American governmental structure on assumptions that the various 
component parts will strive to aggrandize their respective powers.  
 My commentary is compatible with assumptions that both the 
Court and the executive branch are prone to maximize their respec-
tive powers, although it does not rigidly assume that these tenden-
cies permeate their every action. Recognizing the tendencies of insti-
tutions to expand their powers does not require us to attribute crass 
motives to the political actors involved. Both the officials in the ex-
ecutive branch and the justices may seek to maximize their own 
powers from the highest of motives. All of these actors may believe 
that the national welfare can be best furthered through the expan-
sion of their own powers. 
 In their current paper, Cohen and Spitzer direct our attention to 
attempts by the executive branch to maximize its power—or at least 
its opportunity for pursuing its policy program—by choosing the 
cases which it brings before the Court. Their inquiry necessarily fo-
cuses upon the executive branch and provides us with important in-
                                                                                                                  
 17. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Positive Political Theory in the 
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1564 (1995). Professors Eskridge and Frickey have employed the posi-
tive-political-theory approach which takes into account both cooperation and rivalry among 
political institutions. They then focus upon how interdependent institutional decisionmak-
ing may support a view of law as equilibrium among those institutions. See also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term–Forward: Law  as Equi-
librium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 42 (1994). 
 18. See, e.g., Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 394-
95; Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 5, at 456.  
 19. See Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 96.  
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formation about how the Solicitor General’s office operates. But to 
place this information into context requires that we broaden our per-
spective beyond the executive branch. If all of the institutional actors 
are attempting to maximize their powers, then the behavior of both 
the executive branch and the Court begins to make sense. Both the 
strategizing of the executive branch over the certiorari petitions it se-
lects for submission and the wishes of the Court about the cases it 
would like to review become exercises in actual or attempted power 
maximization. The strategizing which the authors reveal to us then 
becomes not a devious exercise by the executive to undermine the 
Court’s law-declaring role, but merely an exercise in interbranch ri-
valry. 
 As I argue below, the strategizing in the Solicitor General’s office, 
which Cohen and Spitzer have identified, is part of an attempt by the 
executive branch to maximize its power. Thus the executive-branch 
strategizing which they identify here nicely complements the judicial 
strategizing which they explained in their earlier papers. Before ex-
amining the ramifications of executive-branch strategizing, however, 
I want to further consider the complementary power-maximizing ac-
tivities of the Court as part of the background against which the ex-
ecutive activity takes place. 
IV.   POWER MAXIMIZING AND THE DISCOUNT RATE: HOW THE COURT 
AND THE EXECUTIVE PLAY THE POWER-MAXIMIZING GAME 
 The government’s jockeying over the cases it selects for review re-
flects the conflict between the government’s policies and the per-
ceived hostile reception which the Court would accord those policies. 
Cohen and Spitzer do not explore the basis for these conflicts in their 
current paper. By contrast, in their Chevron papers, they assumed 
that the government and the Court were both pursuing similar short-
run conservative policies. 
 I make two related suggestions here. First, I suggest that the ac-
tual and potential conflicts which are the subject of the Cohen-
Spitzer analysis, in large measure, may reflect the different perspec-
tives between the two institutions. Contrary to the assumptions of 
their earlier papers, I suggest here that the Court may be maximiz-
ing long-term goals. The conflicts then result from the Court’s focus 
upon long-term objectives and the executive’s focus upon the short-
term. In these conflicts, the Court sees certain long-term issues as 
matters of principle. These issues may be deeply normative or they 
may involve the constitutional structure—such as issues involving 
the allocation of power among the branches of the federal govern-
ment or issues concerning the relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. By contrast, the government is concerned 
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with the pursuit of short-run policies. When the agendas of these two 
institutions are brought together in litigation, some conflict is likely. 
 Second, the contention that the Court is focused upon long-term 
objectives requires me to take issue with the prior analysis of Cohen 
and Spitzer which, in its examination of Chevron, concluded that the 
Court was focused (at least in Chevron) upon short-term objectives. 20 
I review below their approach to the Chevron issue, adding addi-
tional support which would strengthen their conclusions. I conclude, 
however, that Chevron and other cases which can be used to support 
the hypothesis that the Court is focused upon the short-run are ulti-
mately ambiguous on that issue. Because decisions such as Chevron 
also have long-term effects which contain policy implications that are 
inconsistent with the short-run approach and because the pursuit of 
long-run objectives are more compatible with the Court’s institu-
tional capabilities, I conclude that it is more likely that the Court is 
predisposed to a longer-term view than these authors have previ-
ously assumed. 
A.   The Court: Parameters of Power Maximizing 
 There are several models for maximizing the Court’s power. These 
models differ primarily in the perspective through which power 
maximization is viewed. These models also differ on scales measur-
ing both the generality and the longevity of their impact. 
 In the simplest power maximizing model, the Court can intervene 
whenever it desires and impose its own short-run policy position. The 
problem with this model from the Court’s perspective, however, is 
that the Court is unable to intervene in every case where it might 
like to impose its policy views. If the Court can decide only between 
100 and 150 cases per year,21 its impact is likely to be small. Su-
preme Court intervention in an ad hoc (that is, unrelated) manner at 
100 or 150 policy points is unlikely to fully exploit the Court’s poten-
tial power. 
 Conversely, the more that the Court’s decisions impact the core of 
an integrated policy web, the greater the short-run impact of the 
Court’s decisions will be. Thus, the Court could maximize its impact 
by deciding those cases whose influence is most general: cases which 
create precedents controlling or significantly affecting lower court 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 109-10.  
 21. Professor Hellman reports a significant downward trend in the number of plenary 
cases decided by the Court since 1988: 
In the 1989 Term, the number of plenary decisions dropped to 132 [from an av-
erage of 147 cases each term from 1971 through 1988]. . . . [I]n 1990 the num-
ber dropped still further, to 116. Thereafter, with one trivial exception, the ple-
nary docket continued to shrink. The 1995 Term . . . yielded only 77 plenary 
decisions—half the number that the Court was handing down a decade earlier. 
Hellman, supra note 16, at 403. 
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behavior throughout a policy area. Yet, even when the Court selects 
issues for decision which have a wide impact, it runs the risk of dis-
sipating its limited powers. Lawrence Friedman and others have 
pointed out that the resolution of major policy issues often places 
heavy demands upon the Court.22 As the chief decisionmaker possess-
ing the capacity to decide only a small number of cases, the Court 
must be able to develop decisional rules which it can delegate to 
other authorities to administer.23  
 Sometimes, however, the Court has difficulty in formulating a de-
cisional standard which effectively delegates decisionmaking to the 
lower courts. If the decisional standard is unclear, then additional 
clarifying decisions by the Supreme Court may be necessary. But 
these clarifying decisions impinge on the Court’s other work and re-
duce the efficiency of its supervision.  
 Friedman gives as an illustration the early voting-district reap-
portionment decisions of the Court, which are structural decisions 
apparently made for long-term goals.24 In its 1962 decision, Baker v. 
Carr,25 the Court abandoned its previous refusal to review appor-
tionment issues on political question grounds.26 But Baker itself was 
unstable because it did not provide an administrable standard for de-
ciding apportionment issues. It stimulated lawsuits without provid-
ing the criteria for deciding them. Only in 1964 in its decision in 
Reynolds v. Sims,27 and companion cases, did the Court provide the 
“one man, one vote” standard that provided a stable operational 
standard for the lower courts and the state legislatures. Unstable 
rules are those engendering “constant, ceaseless testing of the 
boundaries of doctrine through litigation.”28 The Court has long un-
derstood that its rulings must be operational in the sense that lower 
courts can apply them without continuous monitoring from above. As 
it stated fifty years ago in Universal Camera, the Court wants and 
expects to “intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when 
the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly mis-
applied.”29 
 Chevron provides another illustration of a decision with opera-
tional effect. In their analysis of the Chevron decision, Cohen and 
Spitzer portray it as an exercise in maximizing short-term policy im-
                                                                                                                  
 22. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 
STAN. L. REV. 786 (1967). 
 23. See id. at 815. 
 24. See id. at 817-18. 
 25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 26. See id. at 209. 
 27. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 28. Friedman, supra note 22, at 826. 
 29. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951). 
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pact.30 Whether the Court was motivated by short- or long-term 
goals, however, its decision appears to have met Friedman’s standard 
of operationality. Cohen and Spitzer have suggested that the Court’s 
sympathies during the early years of the Reagan Administration 
were towards the conservative policies of that administration. The 
Court could have chosen to construe the statutory language of the 
Clean Air Act31 rather than to rule on the mode of interpreting regu-
latory statutes. Either way it could have helped to further the con-
servative agenda of the Reagan administration. But by choosing to 
resolve the broader, and hence more far-reaching (interpretative) is-
sue, the Court expanded the policy impact of its decision. By requir-
ing the lower courts to defer to executive branch policies (as it did in 
Chevron) when the relevant statutory provision was ambiguous, the 
Court furthered its policy agenda vastly beyond what it could have 
done by simply deciding the narrow substantive policy issue raised 
by the Chevron litigation: whether it was appropriate to read in the 
“bubble concept” to an interpretation of the “stationary source” term 
in the Clean Air Act. Thus, the Court, in a stroke, compelled the 
lower courts to facilitate the application of conservative policies to 
the whole array of regulatory and administrative programs. 32 More-
over, there was no tradeoff. By retaining the power to determine 
when congressional intent was clear, the Court preserved its ability 
to intervene ad hoc on substantive issues of interpretation whenever 
it wished.33 
 From a related but slightly different perspective, Chevron can also 
be seen as an example of the Court enlisting other institutional ac-
tors (here the lower courts) to carry out its short-term policy agenda. 
Its Chevron decision converted the lower courts from obstructing to 
facilitating the implementation of the Reagan agenda. From this per-
spective, Chevron is an example of how an institution with limited 
resources can expand its power by enlisting the cooperation and sup-
port of other actors. In their influential 1989 article, Matthew D. 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast pointed out how 
legislators who lacked the time and resources to engage in effective 
monitoring could surmount that problem by enlisting private groups 
                                                                                                                  
 30. See Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 109-10. 
 31. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 32. In a legislative context, an enacting coalition would structure legislation in such a 
way as to enlist the aid of an outside group to monitor its administration. See, e.g., Mat-
thew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989). Analo-
gously, here the Court enlisted the aid of the lower courts to support the conservative pro-
gram of the Reagan Administration. 
 33. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 
304-05 (1995). 
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to perform that function.34 By so doing, the legislators could expand 
their power. Chevron shows us that the Court can make use of a 
similar technique to expand its own policy impact. Here the lower 
courts rather than private groups were enlisted in the enterprise. 
But this was no routine case of lower courts following Supreme Court 
instructions about what a statute means: Chevron was focused upon 
the implementation of all administrative and executive interpreta-
tive decisions throughout the entire range of regulatory policy. In 
context, its political impact was uniquely broad. 
 The Court’s decisions on the issue of standing can be seen as simi-
larly furthering the Court’s short-term policy objectives by confining 
or broadening the powers of private groups to assist with enforce-
ment. Through its standing decisions, the Court has been able to 
dampen the activities of liberal environmental activists and to 
strengthen the powers of conservative property owners. Thus in 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,35 and Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,36 the Court cut down the power of environmental groups to 
seek judicial help in imposing strict environmental policies. In Ben-
nett v. Spear,37 the Court enhanced the power of landowners to chal-
lenge government-imposed restrictions under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.38 In so doing, the Court also affected the mix of cases which 
would be brought before the courts. More challenges to aggressive 
government enforcement of environmental laws and fewer challenges 
to government under-enforcement of those laws would be the likely 
result. Analogously to its action in Chevron, the Court maximized its 
policy impact by conferring power on groups pursuing policies consis-
tent with the Court’s substantive views and by reducing the power of 
groups pursuing policies inconsistent with those views. 39 
B.   Another Short-Term Exercise? A Separation-of-Powers Puzzle 
 From 1969 to 1977, the President was Republican while both 
Houses of Congress were controlled by Democrats. The Court had be-
come more conservative. The Court decided Buckley v. Valeo40 in 
1976, during the Gerald Ford presidency. In that decision, the Court 
invalidated an attempt by the Congress to oversee the administra-
tion of its recently enacted federal election law.41 That law had cre-
ated a Federal Election Commission whose membership included 
                                                                                                                  
 34. McCubbins et al., supra note 32, at 479-81. 
 35. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
 36. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 37. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
 38. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1999).  
 39. But cf. McCubbins et al., supra note 32. 
 40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 41. See id. at 140. 
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representatives of both Houses of Congress.42 It dealt with campaign 
financing, a highly sensitive matter to both parties. The structure of 
the Commission is best understood in the light of that subject matter. 
Senators and Representatives from both parties were included in the 
Commission membership in order to assuage concerns from both par-
ties that the legislative compromise be carefully observed. It per-
formed the “fire alarm” function described by McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast: the potential for administrative deviations from the legis-
lative compromise would be minimized and any actual deviations 
would be immediately identified and transmitted to Congress. 43 Yet 
this structure was in patent conflict with the Constitution’s Ap-
pointments Clause.44 The Court’s ruling that the Federal Election 
Commission was unconstitutionally structured, however, is, like 
many decisions, a complex one which can be read at a number of lev-
els. At its most elemental level, Buckley can be read as enforcing the 
literal mandate of the Appointments Clause. Buckley can also be un-
derstood as an attempt by the Court to prevent Congress from im-
pinging upon the prerogatives of the executive branch to administer 
the laws and, concomitantly, to confine the Congress to the task of 
legislating. So understood, Buckley fits a highly formalistic model of 
constitutional structure, a model which the Court perfected during 
the Reagan presidency.45 That model was reinforced and refined dur-
ing the mid-1980s in INS v. Chadha46 and Bowsher v. Synar.47 As I 
will show, Chevron fits neatly into that formalistic model. The ques-
tion here, however, is whether that carefully constructed model is fo-
cused on the short-run or on the long-run. 
                                                                                                                  
 42. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
 43. McCubbins et al., supra note 32, at 434. 
 44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for”).  
 45. This is a model of constitutional structure in which the dividing line between con-
gressional power and executive power is defined by the completion of the process of enact-
ment. Prior to enactment, Congress has the power to formulate policy by incorporating its 
wishes into explicit provisions of the statute. To the degree that Congress fails to specify, it 
effectively delegates power to the executive to develop policy through the course of admin-
istering the statute. This model underlies Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher. It is consistent 
with Chevron. This model is inconsistent with Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 629 (1935), where the Court appeared to blur the lines between the legislative 
and executive branches by allowing administrators to develop in a context which was “in-
dependent” to a significant degree from the executive. This model is formalistic, because it 
focuses upon the formal tasks of the respective branches and neglects the various ways 
(such as through oversight and appropriation) in which Congress can in fact influence ad-
ministration.  
 46. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 47. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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 In Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher, the Court articulated a model 
in which the Congress exhausted its powers in the writing of legisla-
tion. Effectively, it delegated to the executive branch the power to 
formulate policies in the process of administration which were not 
foreclosed by the statutory language. Was this model designed to fur-
ther the short-run policy goals of the Court, enhancing the powers of 
the then-conservative executive branch and restricting the powers of 
the then-liberal Congress? Or was this model designed to optimize 
power allocation over the long haul? Many scholars saw these cases 
as an effort by the Court to encourage Congress to face hard policy 
choices and to resolve them in legislation. Justice Rehnquist’s pro-
posed reinvigoration of the anti-delegation doctrine in American Tex-
tile,48 has been seen as a part of that effort. 49 The core of that effort 
by the Court to force Congress to take greater responsibility for pol-
icy, however, lay in the Court’s denial of Congressional power to 
oversee administration. Issues that Congress saw fit to leave unre-
solved were effectively delegated to the executive branch to resolve in 
the course of administering the legislation. Chevron can be seen as a 
confirmation of this model. In Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher, the 
Court effectively told Congress that issues which it did not resolve in 
the specifics of legislation were delegated to the executive to resolve 
in administration. 
 Chevron can be understood as related to the constitutional model 
which the Court articulated in Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher. In 
Chevron, the Court confirmed the delegation described in the former 
cases: issues not resolved by Congress were to be resolved by gov-
ernment administrators. All of these cases are consistent with an as-
sumption that the Court is pursuing its short-run policy objectives. 
Buckley, Chadha, Bowsher, and Chevron were decided during periods 
in which a Republican sat in the White House and the Democrats 
controlled Congress. Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher restricted Con-
gressional power and Chevron expanded executive power. These re-
sults are consistent with a conservative Court attempting to imple-
ment its own short-run conservative agenda. Yet these cases can also 
be seen as an attempt by the Court to adjust power allocations 
among the branches in accordance with a longer-range vision, one 
independent of its short-term policy impact. 
 Thus, the separation-of-powers model exemplified in Buckley, 
Chadha, Bowsher, and Chevron is ultimately ambiguous. That model 
may have been designed for the short term, but it could also be un-
                                                                                                                  
 48. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 49. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Exami-
nation of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1362 (1996); Paul Maynard 
Kakuske, Clear-Cutting Public Participation in Environmental Law: The Emergency Sal-
vage Timber Sale Program, 29 LOY. L.A. REV. 1859, 1885 (1996). 
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derstood as a model for the long term. Indeed, the short-term expla-
nation is problematic. If these cases are understood as judicial efforts 
to enhance the powers of a conservative executive and to restrict the 
powers of a liberal Congress, then they accomplish perverse results 
when, as during most of the 1990s, the executive is liberal and the 
Congress is conservative. 
 A different approach to maximizing its power would move the 
Court toward structural issues and away from determinations about 
short-run substantive policies. Should the Court adopt a long-run 
time horizon (or a low future discount rate), it would emphasize is-
sues of power allocation and procedure. From this perspective, the 
actual rationale of the Chevron decision would be more in line with 
the reasons articulated in the Court’s opinion. Thus, the Justices 
might have wanted to maximize their power, not by focusing their 
views on substantive policy, but by imposing their views of optimal 
governmental design. From a standpoint of governmental design, it 
is a plausible position for the courts to determine congressional “in-
tent” when that determination can be made from sources in the law 
libraries (the statutory words, the statutory structure, or legislative 
history), but to defer to the administrators on questions which those 
sources leave unanswered or ambiguous. Indeed, such a position 
might be seen as maximizing the power of the judiciary over time by 
excusing them from involvement in minor matters of policy and thus 
reserving their limited decisional capacity for more important mat-
ters. 
C.   The Discount Rate 
 Although the Court may have maximized its short-run policy 
goals in Chevron by reducing lower-court resistance to the conserva-
tive policies of the Reagan Administration, that particular policy goal 
may have been short-lived. With the advent of a liberal Democratic 
administration in 1993, Chevron produces a different effect on the 
liberal-conservative policy continuum. Now Chevron compels the 
courts to accept the liberal policies of the Clinton administration.50 
Neither Chevron nor its application has been modified since the be-
ginning of the Clinton administration.51 With the advent of the 
George W. Bush administration, Chevron will return to an instru-
ment for compelling courts to enforce conservative policies. More to 
the point of the present inquiry, would not the Supreme Court of 
1984 have foreseen the possibility that its Chevron decision would 
one day require the lower courts to further liberal policies? The same 
questions pervade the Court’s separation-of-powers decisions in 
                                                                                                                  
 50. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 51. See id. 
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Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher. From a short-term perspective those 
decisions can be seen as an effort by the Court to constrain a liberal 
Congress. Yet over the long run, they operate as a double-edged 
sword. In the 1990s, these decisions constrained a conservative Con-
gress. 
 The prospect that the effect of Buckley, Chadha, Bowsher, and 
Chevron on substantive policy is reversed with a change in admini-
strations compels us to inquire further into the Court’s decisional 
perspective. Maybe it is interested in short-term results, but those 
short-term successes are eventually offset by longer-term losses. 
Perhaps it operates (at least sometimes) with a short time horizon or 
a high discount rate towards the future. Certainly the differing im-
pact of Buckley, Chadha, Bowsher, and Chevron between the short 
run and the long run would suggest that if the Court is seeking to 
maximize its influence on substantive policies, it must be operating 
with a short time horizon, applying a high discount rate to the fu-
ture. Finally, what are we to say about such cases as Clinton v. New 
York,52 where the Court, in 1998, struck down the line-item veto, 
thus shifting power away from a liberal president? This is, of course, 
what we would expect from a Court preoccupied with short-term po-
litical considerations. But if these short-term objectives were indeed 
motivating the Court, how could it continue to follow the path 
marked out by Chevron through the remainder of the 1990s? 
 It seems unlikely that the Court is operating with the short time 
horizons which would explain Buckley, Chadha, Bowsher, and Chev-
ron as a means of furthering the short-run policies of conservative 
administrations. If the Court were acting upon the basis of such 
short-run concerns, why would it not overrule those decisions when a 
liberal administration came to power? The implausibility of viewing 
those decisions as focused primarily upon the short term is reinforced 
when the Court’s institutional characteristics predisposing it towards 
longer-term considerations are taken into account. 
D.   Institutional Characteristics and Comparative Time Horizons 
 A number of factors indicate that the executive is institutionally 
focused upon events with relatively short time horizons. 53 The Presi-
dent is elected for a four-year term and cannot serve more than two 
terms. Cabinet members serve at the President’s pleasure and thus 
cannot serve longer than the President. These electoral constraints 
help to focus the attention of the President and his cabinet officers 
                                                                                                                  
 52. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 53. On the differing capabilities of governmental institutions, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 40 
(Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959). Hart argues here that the courts are uniquely capable of 
principled decisionmaking. See id. at 42. 
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upon the limited period in which the President holds office. Anything 
he accomplishes must be done during a period which cannot exceed 
eight years. Moreover, the executive is differentially qualified to pur-
sue short-term objectives. The election of the President and his ac-
countability to the electorate focus his attention on policies and pro-
grams which are popular with the electorate and which are generally 
seen to have a short-term payoff. Moreover, the selection, design, and 
pursuit of such short-run policy objectives are often heavily depend-
ent upon information and its analysis. The huge executive bureauc-
racy possesses, among other things, enormous resources for collect-
ing, synthesizing, analyzing, and using information. Those capabili-
ties thus contribute to the executive’s relative advantages in plan-
ning and implementing short-run policies. 
 By contrast, the Supreme Court is institutionally focused upon a 
longer term. The Justices are appointed for life, thus freeing them 
from concern with forthcoming elections and encouraging them to 
take a long-term perspective. Moreover, the freedom of the Justices 
from accountability to the electorate enables them to take unpopular 
positions. Because the Court lacks the information-gathering capac-
ity of the executive, it is less capable of initiating or developing its 
own short-run policy objectives. The Court, of course, can acquire in-
formation from the parties in litigation, but the parties can, concomi-
tantly, deny the Court information which they deem irrelevant or in-
opportune to bring into the record. The Court thus appears unable to 
initiate an informed short-run policy agenda and appears to be dis-
advantaged in reviewing the substance of short-run policy objectives. 
Structural issues having to do with long-term allocations of power 
among the branches and between the federal government and the 
states tend to be more normative and less dependent upon the collec-
tion and analysis of large amounts of information. Thus, the rivalry 
between the Court and the executive over the latter’s docket might 
come to a head in cases in which the long-term goals of the Court 
come into conflict with shorter-term strategies of the executive and of 
Congress. Examples of this kind of conflict are not hard to find.54 
 We have no way of knowing whether, and the extent to which, 
these relative institutional capabilities may affect the Court’s per-
spective. Yet, a fully rational Court would take them into account as 
it set about maximizing its own policy agenda. 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, and holding that Congress’ attempt to compel 
state officers to execute federal laws was unconstitutional); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, as being outside the 
scope of the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking 
down a portion of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985, which 
compelled states to either provide radioactive waste sites or to take title and assume liabil-
ity for all undisposed waste). 
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V.   PUBLIC POLICY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
 By deciding not to seek review of an adverse circuit court decision, 
the government has prevented the Supreme Court from considering 
the issue raised in the litigation and perhaps from affirming the cir-
cuit court ruling. The government therefore pursues its policies in 
the other circuits. Is anyone harmed by this strategizing over ap-
peals? Since the opposing party has prevailed, that party has not 
been injured. Indeed, the opposing party has been saved the legal ex-
penses that it would have incurred on appeal. Because the law 
within the deciding circuit is adverse to the government, the inter-
ests of other persons within the circuit whose circumstances are simi-
lar to the opposing party are observed and protected by the unap-
pealed circuit court ruling.  
 Are there, then, losers in such a situation? Who are they? Are they 
wronged? The losers are those in the other circuits who would have 
been vindicated by a Supreme Court ruling and who must now assert 
their rights in litigation. They must bear the expenses of litigation. 
That is their only loss. Of course, there is no way of knowing whether 
they would in fact prevail. If they litigate, they may be vindicated by 
the lower courts. Or, if not, and the Supreme Court in fact wants to 
decide the issue in their favor, the Court will grant their petition and 
rule in their favor. At most, under this scenario, those disadvantaged 
by the government’s appeal strategy must incur the legal costs of 
vindication. They are unable to “free ride” on the efforts of the par-
ties in the original suit. 
 Who are the winners? The winners may be the public or those 
parts of the public who are being courted by the administration 
through the pursuit of the policies that were challenged in the litiga-
tion. The constitutional scheme contemplates that politicians in the 
elected branches will pursue shorter-term objectives which benefit or 
appear to benefit their constituencies, while the courts will intervene 
in two major types of cases. First, the courts will intervene when 
necessary to impose the unpopular constraints which are essential to 
the constitutional compact: the preservation of essential liberties, the 
protection of minorities, and the maintenance of the constitutional 
structure. Second, the courts will intervene when necessary to im-
pose what may be the presently unpopular terms of a legislative bar-
gain.55 
                                                                                                                  
 55. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 289 (1985) 
(commenting that “where the lines of [the legislative] compromise are discernable, the 
judge’s duty is to follow them”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 533, 544 (1983) (arguing that the scope for judicial interpretation of a statute should 
be “restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative 
process”). See also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 29 (commenting that “the Court 
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 Since under this analysis, the winners from government strategiz-
ing over appeals are the public, that strategizing is not suspect or 
devious conduct. It is behavior likely to further the short-term public 
interest. Of course, even though the short-term public interest is be-
ing furthered, that is not reason to ignore the longer-term interests 
inhering in constitutional provisions or in the terms of a legislative 
bargain. But those interests can seek vindication in litigation. Gov-
ernment strategizing over appeals does not remove their constitu-
tional or legislative protections. It only requires them to bear the ex-
penses of litigation. In short, government strategizing furthers the 
short-run public interest, subject to the continuing potential check 
that someone else will challenge the policy in litigation. 
 Is the government normatively obliged to petition for review those 
cases which it believes it will lose? In this paper I argue that it is not 
so obliged. The constitutional scheme obliges the government to re-
spect the judgments to which it is a party. Generally, the government 
should conform its activities to Supreme Court precedents. But the 
government is not bound to seek unfavorable rulings. As I argue be-
low, the government’s ability to deny the Court the opportunity to 
rule on cases which the Court wants to review is part of the inter-
branch rivalry built into the constitutional structure. 
VI.   IDEALISTIC MISPERCEPTIONS 
 Observers of the high government win-rate before the Supreme 
Court have sometimes lamented the fact that all of the cases which 
the Court would like to review have not been brought before the 
Court. Cohen and Spitzer make the point that the Court is being de-
nied cases which it would like to review, although they are careful 
not to include a normative element to their observation.56 Others, 
however, are not so careful. These others suggest that the Solicitor 
General ought to provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
review cases that the Court would like to review.57 Underlying this 
suggestion is the premise that there is a true or best interpretation of 
                                                                                                                  
will interpret statutes to reflect legislative deals in the short-term and new political bal-
ances over time”). 
 56. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 396.  
 57. Among those adhering to such a view have been several prior Solicitors General, 
including Robert Bork, Archibald Cox, and Philip B. Perlman. See Eric Schnapper, Becket 
at the Bar—The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General , 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1187, 
1219-20 & n.86 (1988). In the hearings on his nomination to be Solicitor General, Bork 
stated: “I do not see how a Solicitor General who imposed his own views upon the appeal 
process and kept cases from the Court that the Court thinks it ought to have, could con-
ceivably retain the trust of that Court.” Nominations of Joseph T. Sneed, of N.C., to be 
Deputy Att’y General and Robert H. Bork, of Conn., to be Solicitor General: Hearings Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 11 (1973). Schnapper discusses the differ-
ing positions on the propriety of the Solicitor General deciding against petitioning in cert-
worthy cases. See Schnapper, supra, at 1219-20. 
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all statutory and constitutional issues and that only the Justices of 
the Supreme Court can tell us what those interpretations are. The 
resolutions of statutory and constitutional issues by other govern-
ment officials do not attain quite the same level of quality as those of 
the Supreme Court. This point of view, which tends towards the con-
ceptualism permeating the continental codes, bears a remarkable re-
semblance to Plato’s allegory in which persons imprisoned in a cave 
saw only shadows of objects but not the objects themselves. 58 Inter-
pretations by executive branch officials might imperfectly reflect the 
ultimate reality of a Supreme Court interpretation, but they would 
be as different in kind as were the shadows in the cave to the objects 
creating them and would, in this view, be entitled to substantially 
less respect. 
 As I argue below, this view does not fit the American constitu-
tional scheme for the following reasons: it fails to recognize the lim-
ited role assigned to the Supreme Court under the Constitution; it 
fails to acknowledge the legitimate role of executive interpretation; 
and it is blind to the Framers’ own strategy of encouraging inter-
branch rivalry. Under the constitutional framework, the Supreme 
Court may have the ultimate responsibility for interpreting the law, 
but only when legal issues are brought before it in a litigation con-
text. When and where the law is interpreted is determined by the 
contingencies of litigation or the requirements of administration. 
Thus, the appropriate philosophical metaphor is not the cave, but 
rather Wittgenstein’s language game in which meaning is deter-
mined by usage.59 
 Yet, the attractiveness of that idealistic view is strong. Even 
Cohen and Spitzer sometimes have employed language or symbols 
suggestive of the Platonic allegory. When they attempt to symbolize 
deference in their PPT analysis, they measure the extent of deference 
from a “best statutory interpretation” (BSI)60 and show deviation 
from the BSI point in two directions: in the liberal direction and in 
the conservative direction.61 Although they surely know that speak-
ing of a best statutory interpretation is an inaccurate mode of speech, 
their presentation conveys the suggestion, however unintentionally, 
that there in fact is a best statutory interpretation.62 This is, of 
course, wrong. Judging the best interpretation of a statute is similar 
to judging Hamlet’s sanity. There are better and worse analyses, but 
                                                                                                                  
 58. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC at pt. vii, ll. 514a-521b (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin 
Books 2d rev. ed. 1987). 
 59. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS  ¶ 43 (G.E.M. An-
scombe trans., MacMillon 1953). 
 60. Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 72-83. 
 61. There they symbolize the scope for Chevron deference as BSI ?  d. See id. 
 62. In their Chevron analysis, that best statutory interpretation was one which even 
the Supreme Court did not tell us. 
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there is no identifiable “best” approach to either issue. The quality of 
statutory interpretation (like the interpretation of Hamlet’s mental 
state) is frequently indeterminate. In using the BSI concept in their 
exposition, Cohen and Spitzer surely are influenced by standard sta-
tistical analysis which measures dispersion in both directions around 
a mean. But there is another latent influence which statistical analy-
sis may exert upon analysts who are working in other fields. Because 
statistical analysis is employed to ascertain the view of a large popu-
lation from a small sample, the underlying understanding is that 
there is a “real” answer which is only approached by the results 
given by the sample. The same is true in regression analysis which 
attempts to ascertain the relation between two or more variables. 63 
The cave allegory is thus apt here. Analysts who immerse themselves 
in statistical analysis must take care not to carry over the implicit 
approach-to-the-ideal attitude when dealing with other subject mat-
ters where there are no “ideal” answers but only contingent ones 
identified by actual behavior. 
 As I argue below, the constitutional scheme limits the opportuni-
ties for the courts to pass on issues of interpretation. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville observed in the passage quoted by Cohen and Spitzer,64 
American courts are passive institutions which interpret constitu-
tional provisions and legislation only when litigants bring issues be-
fore them in a concrete dispute. I establish below that the Solicitor 
General’s selection of the cases to bring before the Court reflects that 
part of the constitutional scheme that is designed to encourage inter-
branch rivalry. But, concomitantly, the respect which each of the 
constitutional branches has for the others has also been understood 
to mean that the courts must (or should) often decline to interpret a 
constitutional or statutory provision, thus recognizing the interpreta-
tive autonomy of the other branches. This tradition is an old one 
which is imbedded in a host of legal doctrines. 65 It acknowledges the 
legitimacy and importance of constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion by executive branch officials. Cohen and Spitzer themselves rec-
                                                                                                                  
 63. See RALPH E. BEALS, STATISTICS FOR ECONOMISTS 234-35 (1972). Beals explains:  
[T]he method of least squares determines estimators of the parameters in the 
true relation Yi = ? + ?Xi + ui; a relation Yi = a + bXi + ei is determined using 
sample data. Each new sample produces new estimates a and b. . . . Whether or 
not a and b are good estimators of ? and ? depends on whether or not their 
probability distributions are concentrated near the true values of the parame-
ters. 
Id. 
 64. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 391 (quot-
ing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE , DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, ch. VI, 99-100 (Alfred A. Knopf 
ed., 1985) (1945)). 
 65. See infra Part VII. 
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ognize the legitimacy of executive branch interpretation in their dis-
cussion of intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence.66 
 The concept of maximizing the opportunities for the Court to an-
swer all unsettled questions is foreign to the mainstream American 
legal tradition. In that tradition, interpretative questions are an-
swered (or not) as the courses of litigation and administration re-
quire. The Court’s role is not only designedly contingent, resolving 
legal issues brought before it only when the parties choose to bring 
cases there, but the Court has affirmatively recognized a duty to 
stand aside in many circumstances in order to permit executive offi-
cials to interpret legal provisions free from judicial interference. 
VII.   PUTTING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR INTO CONTEXT 
  Cohen and Spitzer have prefaced their paper with a quote from 
de Tocqueville: “[A]n American judge can pronounce a decision only 
when litigation has arisen, he is conversant only with special cases, 
and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the 
court.”67 In de Tocqueville’s language the authors find a reference to 
the American judiciary being constrained by a lack of cases. After 
first suggesting that such a reference might be found “quaint” as ap-
plied to the Supreme Court at a time when three thousand or more 
petitioners are seeking certiorari, the authors provide us with an 
analysis which does indeed show that the government, through its 
strategic action, is exerting a constraining effect upon the Supreme 
Court’s docket. The government is denying the Court the opportunity 
to review cases which the Justices might wish to review. The au-
thors, in short, develop the case that de Tocqueville’s remarks re-
main valid and applicable to the Supreme Court, even today, over a 
century and a half after they were first published. 
 The conceptual framework in which Cohen and Spitzer would 
have us view the continuing relevance of de Tocqueville’s remarks is 
one in which both the Court and the government are striving for the 
maximum policy impact. In order to further its policy goals, the 
Court would like to select for review those decisions of the lower 
courts which raise the policy issues the Court would like to address. 
The Court’s power to select its case agenda is constrained by the de-
cisions of the parties regarding whether to seek certiorari. Private 
parties will tend to seek certiorari, weighing only the legal costs of 
Supreme Court review against the probabilities of success. As a re-
sult, the Court is likely to be inundated with certiorari petitions from 
                                                                                                                  
 66. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 402-03; see 
also, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administra-
tive Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989). 
 67. DE TOCQUEVILLE , supra note 64. 
448  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:427 
 
private parties. The government, however, as a continuing player, is 
concerned not only about the result in the case at hand, but about 
the effect of a Supreme Court precedent. An adverse Supreme Court 
precedent constrains the government throughout the United States, 
whereas an unappealed adverse decision in a circuit court constrains 
the government only in that circuit. On the issues which arise in the 
numbered geographical circuits, the damage suffered by the govern-
ment from an adverse Supreme Court precedent would be eleven 
times the damage which it suffers from an adverse circuit court deci-
sion if the circuits were all equally important. As a result, the gov-
ernment is less likely to seek review in those cases where its prob-
abilities of success are low. An unsuccessful appeal impacts the gov-
ernment much more severely than a private litigant. In the language 
of Cohen and Spitzer, the strategizing of the government constrains 
the Court, skewing its decisions in favor of the government.68 
 Putting all this into its context, Cohen and Spitzer are providing 
us not just with a quantitative analysis of Supreme Court decision-
making showing the effects of the government’s strategizing, al-
though this is all that they are claiming. They also provide an analy-
sis of the underlying constitutional structure. De Tocqueville’s de-
scription of an American judge fits the model of judicial decisionmak-
ing which had been embraced by the Framers and adopted by the ju-
diciary during the formative period of American constitutional law. It 
follows, by logical extension, that the government’s strategizing is 
part of that model. 
 Article III itself limits the exercise of the judicial power to “cases 
and controversies,”69 and thus to disputes that are brought before the 
courts by litigants. That the courts lack power to issue rulings or to 
provide advice on their own motion or at the request of others has 
been part of the common understanding and practice from the begin-
ning of the Republic. Hamilton’s description of the proposed federal 
judiciary in the Federalist Papers70 takes for granted the fact that 
the judiciary is a passive institution, reacting only to cases brought 
before it. As he notes, the judiciary “can take no active resolution 
whatever,”71 its limited strength consisting of “merely judgment.”72 
Hamilton’s conclusion that “the judiciary is beyond comparison the 
weakest of the three departments of power”73 assumes this passive 
role for the judiciary. And a mere three years after the adoption of 
the Constitution, Hayburn’s Case74 reported that the Court declined a 
                                                                                                                  
 68. See Cohen & Spitzer, Government Litigant Advantage, supra note 1, at 394-95.  
 69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 70. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 465-66. 
 74. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).  
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request of the Attorney General to perform tasks outside of a litiga-
tion context. This insistence that the Court act only in the context of 
specific litigation was reconfirmed the following year in the famous 
Correspondence of the Justices.75 In that correspondence, Chief Jus-
tice John Jay and his Associate Justices refused President Washing-
ton’s request to advise him on the meaning of certain treaties and 
agreements because those interpretative questions did not come be-
fore the Court in litigation.76 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,77 
Justice Marshall described the “judicial power” conferred on the fed-
eral courts by Article III as exercisable only in a litigation context: 
Thus, according to Marshall, “[t]hat power is capable of acting only 
when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights 
in the form prescribed by law.”78 This model indeed underlies the 
great case of Marbury v. Madison,79 where the Court first exercised 
its power to review congressional legislation for constitutionality. 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, there defined appellate ju-
risdiction as one which “revises and corrects the proceedings in a 
cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.”80 Thus, 
Marbury not only accepted the passive judicial model, but employed 
it as a premise for conforming the Court’s appellate work to that pas-
sive model. 
 As is also well known, the Framers divided governmental powers 
among Congress, the executive branch and the courts as a means of 
forestalling an excessive concentration of power among any person or 
group. Well aware of the human tendency to seek ever greater influ-
ence and power, the Framers enlisted this tendency in their efforts to 
ensure that power would remain dispersed over time. Madison’s fa-
mous remark that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion”81 describes the Framers’ strategy: The efforts of each branch to 
aggrandize its powers will be offset by efforts of the other branches to 
aggrandize their own. Thus, the vision of Cohen and Spitzer that the 
Supreme Court Justices have their own views of governmental policy 
and that they would like to maximize their policy impact largely 
tracks the assumptions of the Framers. Because the Court cannot act 
until cases are brought before it, the Court is dependent upon liti-
gants to supply those cases. As Cohen and Spitzer show us, the gov-
ernment actively withholds cases from Supreme Court review. This 
                                                                                                                  
 75. See Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President George 
Washington (August 8, 1793), reprinted in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891). 
 76. See id. 
 77. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 78. Id. at 819. 
 79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 80. Id. at 175. 
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
450  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:427 
 
government strategizing is one means by which the executive branch 
constrains the power of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the circumstance 
which Cohen and Spitzer describe is one in which the Court wants to 
constrain the executive by issuing adverse decisions and in which the 
executive, aware of this potential, seeks to avoid this constraint. This 
is, par excellence, the interbranch rivalry which the Framers contem-
plated and sought to encourage. 
VIII. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY, STRATEGIZING, AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 Employing a variation of the positive political theory (PPT) analy-
sis which Cohen and Spitzer used in earlier papers82 and imposing a 
reality-simplifying liberal/conservative continuum, we could con-
struct a one-dimensional diagram outlining the operations of the 
constitutional scheme. In the context of the 1990s when we had a lib-
eral executive, a conservative Senate, a more conservative House and 
a conservative Supreme Court, the alignment of these institutions is 
represented on the diagram below.83 
 
 
 
Liberal Conservative 
  SQ1 P    S    C    H    SQ2 
 
 
 
 On these assumptions, new legislation can be enacted only if the 
status quo lies to the right of H or to the left of P. If the status quo is 
at SQ1, then all three institutions which participate in the legislative 
process (P, S, H) would favor moving the status quo to the right. In 
the absence of horse trading, the new legislation would move the 
status quo only to P, since the President would veto legislation mov-
ing the status quo further to the right. If the status quo lies at SQ2 
the new legislation would move the status quo to the left, but not fur-
ther than H, since the House would not agree to a move further to 
the left. Should the status quo lie anywhere between P and H, there 
will be no legislation changing it, because a movement in either di-
rection would be vetoed by at least one of the three institutions 
whose interest would be adversely affected by such a move. Thus, in 
a case in which the President and the two Houses of the Congress 
                                                                                                                  
 82. See Cohen & Spitzer, Chevron Puzzle, supra note 2, at 69-83; Cohen & Spitzer, 
supra note 5, at 441-43, 450-51. As they have noted, they drew their notation from William 
N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (1992). 
 83. The notation is straightforward: P = President; S = Senate; C = Supreme Court; H 
= House. 
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differ in their ideologies, the constitutional scheme contemplates that 
the only legislation that will be enacted will be that which changes 
situations lying outside of a central ideological core bounded by the 
left-most and the right-most ideological positions of the three institu-
tions that participate in legislating. That central core marks the 
broad area in which there are no legislative changes. 
 Now let us explore the Supreme Court’s role on this continuum. 
We will do this with the use of two models, which differ from each 
other primarily in their complexity. The first model is extremely 
simple. In this very simple model, the Supreme Court is limited to af-
firming or reversing the decision below. An affirmance endorses the 
decision below, thus making the lower-court ruling that of the Su-
preme Court. In this model, a reversal is constrained by the rationale 
supplied by the appealing party in the sense that the Court, in re-
versing a circuit court decision, cannot move on the liberal-
conservative spectrum beyond the scope allowed by the rationale 
supplied by the appealing party.  
 In reversing, the Court is, however, free to move within the con-
fines of the appealing party’s rationale. Thus the appealing party’s 
rationale sets the limits of the Court’s movement on the liberal-
conservative spectrum, but within those limits, the Court is free to 
select the point on that spectrum where it wishes to place its own de-
cision. We also assume that the impact of a decision by a circuit court 
is limited to that circuit and that a Supreme Court decision has a na-
tionwide impact. Finally, we ignore the unnumbered circuits (the 
Federal Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit) and assume 
that the policy impact of any circuit court is equal to the policy im-
pact by any other circuit court. Thus, the policy impact of a Supreme 
Court decision is eleven times the impact of the policy impact of a 
circuit court.  
 In the simplest version, the model suggests that the government 
(represented by P above) will appeal cases whose results lie to the 
left of P. In those cases, the Supreme Court’s policy objectives and 
the government’s policy objectives are opposed to the ruling below. 
The government will appeal, because it wants a reversal, and it is 
encouraged to appeal because it believes that the Supreme Court will 
reverse.84 This model also suggests that the government will appeal 
cases whose results lie to the right of C. In those cases, the Supreme 
Court’s policy objectives and the government’s policy objectives are 
also opposed to the ruling below. The government will appeal, be-
cause it wants a reversal, and it is encouraged to appeal because it 
                                                                                                                  
 84. In these cases (where the lower court decision lies to the left of P) the government 
appeals, but it provides a rationale which limits the Court to a move to the right no further 
than P. 
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believes that the Supreme Court will reverse.85 The government will 
not, however, appeal cases whose results lie to the right of P and to 
the left of C. Cases whose results fall on this part of the policy spec-
trum would be affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
 Note that the lower court decisions which the government appeals 
in this model lie at the two extremities of the ideological continuum. 
Lower court results which fall in a central core bounded by P and C 
are not appealed. The results of the government’s decision whether to 
appeal resemble the results of the legislative process. Results which 
are given (in the case of legislation) by a preexisting status quo or by 
a lower court decision falling within an ideological center are left 
alone. No legislation alters a status quo situation falling within a P-
H central core. No lower court decisions falling within a P-C central 
core are appealed. The constitutional structure of three branches 
(and a legislative branch divided between two houses) vying with 
each other over power and policy issues produces these results. 
 We will now proceed to a more complex model. In this model, the 
Supreme Court is no longer limited merely to affirming or reversing 
the decision below, nor is the Court confined by the rationales sup-
plied by the parties. In this more complex model, the Court can af-
firm, reverse, modify, remand with instructions, or handle cases in 
all of the various ways that the Supreme Court actually does. More-
over, in this model the Court accompanies its decision with an opin-
ion setting forth its construction of the law. These additional powers 
of the Court complicate the government’s decision whether to appeal. 
Should the government appeal a decision whose results fall to the left 
of P, the Court is no longer limited merely to reversing. Now the 
Court can reverse and accompany that reversal with an opinion, per-
haps imposing an interpretation of the law which would fall on the 
policy continuum somewhere to the right of P. The government now 
has to consider whether it wants to seek a reversal of a lower court 
decision falling to the left of P so badly that it is willing to bear the 
risk that, in reversing, the Court will impose an interpretation to the 
right of P. 
 Let us make this complex model more precise. We assume that 
there are limits or bounds to the possible interpretations of any con-
stitutional or statutory provision that may come before the Court. 
These limits are set by constitutional or statutory text and the ac-
cepted modes of argumentation. In the diagram below, the range of 
possible interpretation is indicated. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 85. In these cases (where the lower court decision lies to the right of C) the govern-
ment appeals, but, in reversing, the Court will choose to move no further to the left than 
its own policy preferences at C. 
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       P      C 
Liberal Conservative 
      a lc     b 
      {——————————} 
         interpretative range 
 
 In this diagram, a circuit court has decided a case with policy re-
sults which fall at lc on the liberal/conservative continuum. The gov-
ernment objects to the decision because its results are too liberal. 
The government is confident that if it seeks Supreme Court review, 
the Court will reverse the lower court decision, because its results 
are also too liberal for the Supreme Court. But the government be-
lieves that there is sufficient interpretative leeway in the legal provi-
sion at issue for it to be interpreted in ways that could range from a 
to b on the liberal/conservative policy continuum. Thus, an appeal 
would enable the Court to impose an interpretation at the b end of 
the interpretative range, the possible interpretation most consonant 
with the Court’s objectives. Even though the government is dis-
pleased with the lc interpretation of the lower court, it will probably 
decide to live with an interpretation which is too liberal but which is 
confined to one circuit rather than to seek review and enable the Su-
preme Court to impose an interpretation which is too conservative 
and whose impact extends throughout all eleven numbered circuits. 
 This complex model describes in PPT terms the government 
strategizing identified by Cohen and Spitzer. It is a description of the 
interbranch jockeying for advantage which the Framers intended. In 
at least some situations, the PPT framework enables us to describe 
the interbranch rivalry with greater conceptual clarity. In the com-
plex model described above, it reveals the difficulties which the gov-
ernment often faces. The government must balance the positive ef-
fects of a likely Supreme Court reversal which the government wants 
against the negative effects of the Court’s doctrinal statements which 
the Court may include in its opinion. 
IX.   LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND TRADITIONS OF EXECUTIVE 
AUTONOMY 
 The preceding pages have shown that the constitutional design 
contemplates the interbranch rivalry which would be generated 
when each of the branches seeks to maximize its own powers. Those 
pages have also shown that government strategizing about which 
cases to appeal fits the model of interbranch rivalry. Government 
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strategizing is therefore the kind of behavior which the Framers con-
templated and sought to foster. 
 Now I want to shift the focus ever so slightly from interbranch ri-
valry to a focus upon the autonomy of each of the constitutional 
branches. There is, of course, a major overlap between these perspec-
tives. Autonomy is almost a necessary precondition for rivalry, and 
the aggressive assertion by a branch (the executive, for example) of 
its autonomy can (and often does) constitute part of the interbranch 
rivalry which has already been discussed. Despite the overlap be-
tween these perspectives, I want to focus directly upon the extent to 
which the constitutional design has engendered traditions concerned 
with preserving the autonomy of the branches. More precisely, be-
cause of our present concern with executive strategizing, I want to 
examine the traditions which would add further support to that ac-
tivity, beyond that which the discussion has so far identified. 
A.   Executive Autonomy Independently Asserted 
 The separation-of-powers traditions concerned with the claim of 
each of the branches to operate autonomously have two faces. The 
first face of this tradition concerns the extent to which each branch 
may assert its own independence in interpreting the laws, apart from 
the question of whether that independence is recognized by the other 
branches. While today there is widespread recognition—including 
recognition by the courts—that the interpretative authority of the 
executive at least sometimes takes precedence to that of the courts,86 
there are a variety of views as to the extent to which the President 
and his officials may operate independently from judicial interpreta-
tions. My colleague, Mike Paulsen, takes an especially strong view of 
executive branch interpretative independence.87 Paulsen argues that 
the President is free, at least in some circumstances, to disregard ju-
dicial interpretations, even those by the Supreme Court. In support 
of his position Paulsen relies on a variety of sources, including Madi-
son’s statement in the Federalist Papers that no department “can 
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries 
                                                                                                                  
 86. See infra Part IX.B. 
 87. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of 
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between their respective powers.”88 Paulsen also brings up President 
Lincoln’s refusal to obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Jus-
tice Roger Taney,89 and his rejection of the Dred Scott decision90 as a 
rule binding upon the President and Congress.91 Paulsen could have 
also cited President Andrew Jackson’s refusal to enforce the Court’s 
ruling in Worcester v. Georgia.92 
 On the opposite extreme from Paulsen is the position recently ar-
gued by Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer that the Supreme 
Court’s resolutions of constitutional issues are broadly binding on the 
executive: the Court’s resolutions carry obligatory force beyond the 
judgments and the parties to those judgments. 93 The Court’s resolu-
tions are binding beyond the particular case, these authors contend, 
because society needs coordination, cooperation and, especially, au-
thoritative settlements of controversial issues. 94 Although Alexander 
and Schauer focus upon constitutional interpretations, the logic of 
their position appears to demand official deference to the Court’s leg-
islative interpretations as well. 
 A perhaps more common view sees the executive as obliged to re-
spect judgments to which it is a party, but as not necessarily obliged 
to accept a judicial interpretation beyond the particular judgment. 
This view is an old one, sometimes associated with Chief Justice Ta-
ney.95 It is also a modern view, one exemplified by the practice of 
government nonacquiesence in lower-court decisions invalidating 
administrative rules. 96 Indeed, Cohen and Spitzer acknowledge pow-
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erful arguments supporting that practice and appear to accept its le-
gitimacy. 
B.   Judicial Recognition of Executive Autonomy. 
 The second face of the traditions concerned with the autonomy of 
the respective branches is more benign and less controversial. It in-
volves the respect which each branch accords to the right of the other 
branches to operate free from interference. It includes judicial re-
spect for the interpretative functions of executive officials. Indeed, 
there is a long and continuous tradition of judicial recognition of a 
need for the executive branch to carry out its own activities, includ-
ing interpreting the laws, free from judicial interference. First, the 
courts have long recognized that they can best respect executive 
branch autonomy by restricting their own interpretative role to the 
litigation context. That was Justice Marshall’s point in Marbury: al-
though the duty to review statutes could not be escaped,97 it was nar-
rowly limited. Disavowing any intention to intrude into the process of 
administration, he strictly confined judicial review to the litigation 
context, and even within the litigation context, to cases where “rights 
of individuals” were at issue.98 This careful delineation of the judicial 
task to avoid interfering with the tasks of administration would be 
refined in the Taney Court but its broad outlines would be preserved. 
 Thus, forty-some years after Marbury, the Court was again called 
upon to recognize an allocation of interpretative tasks between the 
judiciary and executive officials. In Decatur v. Paulding,99 the Court 
abstained while executive officials performed their “interpretative” 
duties. In that case, the Court refused to interpret legislation in or-
der to avoid interfering with the administration of the Navy Depart-
ment.100 The widow of a naval officer had claimed pensions both un-
der special legislation enacted for her and under general legisla-
tion.101 The Naval Secretary had ruled that she could choose to take 
under either legislative grant but not under both.102 When the widow 
sought to mandamus the Secretary, the Supreme Court refused to in-
terfere with the Secretary’s interpretative judgments, thus providing 
support to the view that it was the task of each branch to interpret 
legal provisions for itself. The approach of the Court in the Decatur 
case is represented today in a host of administrative law doctrines 
restricting the occasions when the courts can exercise their interpre-
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tative powers: doctrines precluding judicial review entirely,103 the ex-
haustion doctrine,104 and ripeness.105 The very existence of these doc-
trines establishes not only the propriety of executive branch interpre-
tation but also the propriety of an area in which the authority to in-
terpret falls, in the first instance, on the executive branch. 
C.   Executive Autonomy and the Politics of Interbranch Rivalry 
 There is some ground for believing that the Court’s recognition of 
executive interpretative autonomy may reflect constraints on judicial 
expansion that have been generated from time to time from the poli-
tics of interbranch rivalry. Thus, the narrow limits within which Jus-
tice Marshall’s assertion of the power of judicial review was confined 
may reflect the political realities of the time—so also may the fact 
that this assertion was combined with a ruling that avoided a con-
frontation with the executive.106 Marshall, in short, sought to maxi-
mize the Court’s power, but within limits of the politically obtain-
able. Similarly, a generation later, when Chief Justice Taney ap-
proved the issuance of a writ of mandamus by the lower courts to the 
Postmaster General,107 a cabinet officer, he confined the circum-
stances for the writ within narrow limits, later confirming these limi-
tations on the writ when he required the courts to abstain from inter-
fering with the interpretative work of the Naval Secretary.108 Taney 
then too appears to have taken an expansive view of the judicial 
power, while judiciously accepting the limits which the political reali-
ties of the time imposed. 
 The array of contemporary judicial doctrines requiring the courts 
to respect the autonomy of executive officials109 probably reflects pre-
sent-day political realities. Thus, for example, the apogee of the ex-
haustion doctrine, which occurred during the New Deal period after 
the election of 1936, confirmed the popularity of President Franklin 
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Roosevelt and strengthened his hand in his struggle with the 
Court.110 Inroads into the scope of the doctrine began to appear dur-
ing the Eisenhower administration,111 when government activism 
had ceased and the public wanted stability. On this view, judicial re-
spect for executive autonomy itself has a double face. One face re-
flects a judicial internalization of the separation-of-powers doctrine: 
the courts in fact believe that each branch should be free to perform 
its own work without interference from the other branches. But the 
other face reflects the political realities limiting the judicial potential 
for expanding its powers. 
X.   CONCLUSION 
 The government carefully selects the cases for which it seeks cer-
tiorari. In doing so, it enhances its win-rate. This is a process by 
which the government impedes the opportunities for the Supreme 
Court to project its power. This governmental behavior is part of the 
broad scheme of checks and balances that the Framers contemplated 
when they divided governmental powers among the three branches. 
Cohen and Spitzer have provided us with a valuable quantitative de-
scription of this process. In so doing, they are staking out a produc-
tive path for much future research, research which will provide new 
conceptual and descriptive insight into the actual operations of the 
constitutional scheme. 
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